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In response to several requests, I comment on the now established maladministration of the Ayers-Caesar situation and I also expand on the provisions of section 57 of the Constitution, to which I referred last week in connection with the introduction into the Cabinet of a new finance minister.
Marcia Ayers-Caesar was appointed a High Court judge and sworn in before she had completed many matters outstanding before her in the Magistrates’ Court, where she had been sitting immediately before her appointment. She was in fact the chief magistrate.
The Chief Justice is the chairman of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission (the JLSC), which had appointed her to the High Court.
The JLSC did not accept the decision of the Court of Appeal in judicial review proceedings brought by Ayers-Caesar that the Commission acted unlawfully in procuring her resignation from the High Court. It appealed to the Judicial Committee of Privy Council (the PC) and lost the appeal.
The appeal to the PC was itself ironic given the strong belief of some that we should not be running to London with appeals when there is the option to join the established Caribbean Court of Justice.
One may take note of the finding that the JLSC was motivated by “an understandable desire to resolve the practical problem” resulting from the likelihood of the part-heard cases having to start again before another magistrate. Nevertheless, the JLSC made awful mistakes and fundamentally mishandled the situation.
Photo: TTPS.
The JLSC did not act fairly in giving Ayers-Caesar the opportunity to respond to allegations made against her, of which she should have been given notice by the JLSC. The opportunity to be heard is a fundamental requirement of fairness.
The JLSC was also found to have placed Ayers-Caesar under pressure to resign and the PC concluded that “pressing a Judge to resign by holding out the threat of disciplinary proceedings, as the Commission did in the present case, circumvents the constitutional safeguards laid down in section 137 and undermines their purpose.”
Even though the JLSC may not have been motivated by ill-feeling towards Ayres-Caesar, it is shocking that a body headed by the Chief Justice did not understand how to act fairly and how to respect the provisions of section 137 of the Constitution.
As described by the PC, this is the section that “addresses the need to protect the judiciary against the threat to judicial independence, and therefore to the impartial application of the law, which would arise if the removal process could be used by the executive to penalise or intimidate judges.”
For these acts of maladministration—in not treating Ayers-Caesar fairly and undermining the constitutional protection given to judges—the Chief Justice must be held fully accountable.
It is worth noting also that one argument deployed on behalf of the JLSC, against the allegation of unfairness by Ayers-Caesar, appeared to the PC to be “artificial and un-principled”.
Now a brief further word why the circumstances surrounding the existence of the notorious 18-18 government, in my view, do not apply in the present circumstances of the dissolution of Parliament within 24 hours after the appointment of a new prime minister and before a new minister of finance could take the additional oath of allegiance in Parliament.
That additional oath is required by section 57 of the Constitution. Without taking it the new minister of finance cannot participate in proceedings in Parliament.
That section expressly requires that oath to be taken before the House, but it expressly makes an exception by prescribing that the election of the presiding officers of the two Houses of Parliament may take place before the members take that oath, as happened following the 18-18 deadlock of December 2001.
That is not an exception applicable when the Parliament was not hamstrung by circumstances beyond its control. The new Prime Minister chose to dissolve it.
Photo: OPM.
Was the taking of the additional oath before the House sub-ordinated to electoral strategy?
It may not matter now that the new minister of finance, without taking the additional oath, cannot participate in the business of a Parliament, which has already been dissolved.
Is that, however, the only consequence in this unique situation?
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Martin G Daly SC is a prominent attorney-at-law. He is a former Independent Senator and past president of the Law Association of Trinidad and Tobago.
He is chairman of the Pat Bishop Foundation and a steelpan music enthusiast.
The Case for the Removal of the Chief Justice: A Legal and Ethical Necessity
The judgment in Ayers-Caesar v Judicial and Legal Service Commission & Anor ([2025] UKPC 15) unequivocally condemns the conduct of the Chief Justice (CJ) in his handling of the Ayers-Caesar debacle. The Privy Council’s ruling highlights significant procedural failures, a clear conflict of interest in the CJ’s three roles, and conduct that has severely undermined public confidence in the judiciary. Given these findings, the removal of the CJ is not merely an option but an imperative if the integrity of the judicial system is to be preserved.
The Privy Council’s Findings: Procedural Impropriety and Conflict of Interest
The CJ’s actions were fundamentally flawed in both procedure and ethics. The Privy Council found that:
Breach of Natural Justice: The CJ, in his capacity as Chairman of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission (JLSC), effectively pressured Justice Ayers-Caesar to resign without affording her the fundamental right to be heard in her defence. This contravenes the well-established principles of procedural fairness.
Conflicted Roles: The CJ failed to maintain the required separation between his three distinct roles—(i) as head of the judiciary, (ii) as Chairman of the JLSC, and (iii) as an adviser to Ayers-Caesar. This conflict created a situation where he acted as both decision-maker and interested party, leading to a serious breach of judicial ethics.
Judicial Mismanagement and Reputational Damage: By mishandling the process and failing to uphold the required procedural safeguards, the CJ not only compromised Ayers-Caesar’s position but also brought the judiciary into disrepute. The Privy Council recognised that judicial integrity is paramount in a democratic society, and any conduct that erodes public trust in the judiciary must be addressed.
The Legal Standard for Removal: Section 137 of the Constitution
Under Section 137 of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution, a judge (including the CJ) may be removed for “inability” or “misbehaviour.” The Privy Council’s judgment establishes that the CJ’s conduct meets both of these criteria:
Inability: The CJ’s failure to maintain the necessary separation of his roles and his mismanagement of the Ayers-Caesar affair demonstrate a clear inability to perform his judicial functions impartially and competently.
Misbehaviour: The CJ’s actions amount to judicial misconduct. By pressuring a sitting judge to resign under the threat of disciplinary action without due process, he failed to uphold the principles of fairness and justice.
Public Confidence and the Need for Accountability
The Privy Council emphasised that “public confidence in the judicial system and the integrity of the judiciary is of utmost importance.” Given the findings of the judgment, allowing the CJ to remain in office would set a dangerous precedent that undermines judicial accountability. The legal profession, civil society, and the public at large must demand adherence to the highest ethical standards in judicial office.
The argument advanced by Yaseen Ahmed that the CJ’s removal is “misplaced” ignores the crux of the Privy Council’s ruling. If a judge can be removed for failing to manage a backlog of cases, surely a Chief Justice who has been found to have acted improperly in a matter of constitutional significance cannot be allowed to remain in office. The rule of law must be upheld consistently and without fear or favour.
Conclusion: The Only Viable Course of Action
Given the gravity of the Privy Council’s findings, the CJ’s continuation in office is untenable. His conduct has damaged the reputation of the judiciary, eroded public trust, and violated the principles of natural justice. Under Section 137, the President has the constitutional authority to initiate the process for his removal. Failing to act would not only condone judicial misconduct but would also set a perilous precedent for future judicial accountability.
In the interests of justice, integrity, and the rule of law, the CJ must be removed from office. The public, the legal fraternity, and those who value the sanctity of the judiciary must insist upon this outcome. Anything less would be a betrayal of the fundamental principles upon which the judicial system is built.